VOLUME 1, ISSUE 2 — SPRING 2007

Today, Europe’s newly formed eastern borders and its southern-most borders face great immigration pressure from those who enter illegally in pursuit of a better life in Europe (1) —approximately 25 percent of the world’s migrants reside in the EU-15. (2) With the addition of 10 states, enlargement highlights the differences between members, and underscores the difficulty of creating an EU-wide immigration policy (3) that addresses cultural diversity, political traditions and nationalistic tendencies.

Whether immigration issues merit an integrated European policy or if they should remain a matter of the state presents an incredible challenge to both the supranational and intergovernmental nature of the EU, and exposes the cultural and political differences that surround this highly sensitive debate. (4) Due to Europe’s low birth rates and high social spending, an integrated immigration policy seems necessary in order for EU members to support an aging population and maintain economic growth. Given the collective nature of the problem, there exists a clear incentive for drafting an integrated immigration policy.

Furthermore, as the market and monetary policies represent the most advanced components of European integration, one could argue that immigration policy should become EU-wide— especially if migrant labor is viewed as a factor of production. Yet, the very notion of a supranational power assuming one of the classical responsibilities of a state, that of determining how to control borders, threatens basic state sovereignty. Further compounding the problem, “European immigration has reintroduced cultural, religious and ethnic diversity at a time when Europeans are witnessing a challenge to the very idea of their nation-state.” (5) Indeed, immigration policy embodies the bittersweet relationship between the member states’ desires to preserve national identity and their commitment to deepen and widen the European Union.

This research reveals the challenges Europe faces in drafting an EU-wide immigration policy using two distinct lenses: 1) economic growth, and 2) maintaining socio-cultural authority at the national level. With regards to economic growth, every year thousands of illegal immigrants make their way to the European Union in pursuit of economic opportunity. National newspapers are littered with tragic tales of immigrants’ failed attempts to cross Europe’s exterior borders; meanwhile, the pervasiveness of human trafficking and the smuggling of peoples provide evidence that millions of migrants work illegally in the EU. (6) Indeed, one cannot deny that a demand for migrant labor exists. (7) Clearly, policymakers must consider skilled and unskilled migration in response to demands from business and, most importantly, larger demographic trends. (8)

Thus, if immigration is understood as a factor of production—that of labor—and if economic integration is the EU’s greatest achievement then, naturally, immigration policy should fall within the scope of an EU-wide mandate. In the coming years, Europe will depend tremendously on immigration in order to sustain economic growth and support its low birth rates, its aging population, and member states’ generous welfare systems. By 2010, the working-age population in the EU will start to shrink; in fact, the old-age dependency ratio will jump from 24% for the EU-15 to almost 50% by 2050, (9) which means “that the EU will move from having four persons of working age for every elderly citizen to only two.” (10) While the pool of working-age residents diminishes, an aging population will exhaust the welfare system and increase healthcare costs. Ultimately, this strain on the economy will lead to a demand for productivity and labor. In creating an integrated immigration policy, the EU can more effectively fill the gap between labor demand and supply.

Under the second lens, that of maintaining socio-cultural authority at the national level, a member state’s historical and social relationship to its immigrant population influences domestic policy-making. Eytan Meyers, Professor of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, deems this relationship the national identity approach, which “argues that the unique history of each country, its conceptions of citizenship and nationality, as well as debates over national identity and social conflicts within it, shape its immigration policies.” (11) For instance, Spain’s colonial conquest in Latin America renders a unique historical tie to immigrants from this region—a connection most notable in that of shared language, religion, and tradition. As such, the Spanish government may want to independently rectify past injustices, preserve diplomatic relationships with Latin American nations, or merely incorporate illegal immigrants into its own system by granting amnesty without the authority of the EU. (12) The notion of ceding these responsibilities to the EU makes immigration policy an incredibly sensitive issue.

Before moving forward, let us now turn to the European Union’s experience with immigration and emigration trends.

European Union: Free Movement of Labor and Historical Immigration Patterns
Not until after the success of the European Coal and Steel Community in pacifying relations between France and Germany, did the notion of free movement of labor materialize in the setting of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, signed by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Italy. The Treaty of Rome, established the European Community (EC), the EC Commission, Council, Parliament, Court, and Economic and Social Committees. It also allowed the free movement of labor within the six EC members. Articles 48.1 and 48.2 read:

“Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community…. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.” (13)

Thus in order to create a strong union, the EC sought to eliminate internal restrictions, promote the free movement of human capital, and most importantly, encourage inter-European migration.(14)

Europe underwent tremendous economic growth in the post-war decades. In the 1950s and 60s labor shortages in the north were satisfied by intra-European migrant workers coming from Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece. Despite the efforts to encourage intra-member migration, the 1970s reflected a period in which internal migration slowed while external migratory pressures increased – specifically from North Africa and Eastern Europe. The latter would become more problematic in 1990 with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and German reunification. (15)

Thus, Europe underwent two distinct, yet related reversals in migration trends; while southern European countries became receiving rather than sending countries, Western Europe as a whole relied less on internal labor migration and experienced external migratory pressures. We can attribute the reversal in migration trends to tightening immigration policies in the north (especially Germany) (16), to economic growth in the south, and partly to decolonization. (17) Incoming migrants proceeded largely from former colonies and neighboring non-EU countries. (18) Given that this migration reversal coincided with worldwide economic recession of the 1970s, “new foreign workers were often blamed for economic and social problems of the host country;” (19) this created socio-cultural and political xenophobic tendencies, an issue addressed in further detail below.

The Schengen Agreements of 1985 and 1990 further impacted Europe’s internal migratory flows by abolishing internal border controls and creating a single external frontier. With no controls at inner-European borders, insecurity mounted with respect to transnational migration processes, or “migratory vulnerability.” (20)

Although Schengen initially started as an intergovernmental agreement, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated certain aspects of Schengen into the EU’s legal and institutional framework. On 20 May 1999, the Council of Ministers formed the Schengen Acquis, (21) which requires members to: harmonize the rules regarding conditions of entry and visas for short stays; enhance police cooperation regarding border control (the UK and Ireland participate in this portion of Schengen); and adopt measures to fight illegal immigration. (22) Here, the Council officially recognizes the need for an integrated approach in addressing illegal immigration. (23)

Additionally, the Commission laid out a vision for an integrated immigration policy that moves beyond common asylum policies and border control to forge partnerships with countries of origin, integrate nationals of non-EU member states already resident in the EU, define a common legal framework for admission of economic immigrants, and set levels of future immigration. (24) Despite the Commission’s desire to create an integrated immigration policy, the deepening and widening process of EU enlargement presents yet another challenge to the process.

The 2004 enlargement, in which ten new members joined, increased the EU area by 34 percent.(25) As a result, old members’ concerns over migration issues increased; hence, widening EU membership stifled the process of deepening immigration policies. (26) Although the Schengen Acquis document officially recognizes that immigration issues warrant a European solution, there nevertheless exists a small uniformity of laws relating to labor, social rights, and migration policy. Today, one could say that the process of creating a single immigration policy is the least developed component of contemporary European integration. (27)

Keeping this backdrop in mind, let us now turn to one of the greatest economic and social challenges the EU faces today – that of demographics. Put simply, with an aging population and low birth rates, Europe cannot afford to grow old. (28)

An aging population and the labor supply shortage
Classical economic theory, as put forth by Adam Smith, suggests that three factors of production exist: land, labor, and capital. In applying this theory to EU member states, we observe that enlargement expands land, the free movement of people expands labor, and a common monetary policy and the Euro expand capital. Although the expansion of land and capital seem obvious, the expansion of labor is on the decline given the low birth rates that plague all 25 EU members.(29) This in turn negatively impacts economic growth and productivity on an EU-wide basis.

The EU’s declining fertility rates have “reached the point that, in some states, deaths outnumber births.” (30) Even though Germany, Italy, Greece, and Sweden already experienced natural declines in their native population, indicating a strong immigrant presence, Europe nevertheless requires 47 million immigrants to keep its population constant over the next 50 years. An additional 33 million are necessary to maintain the pool of working Europeans aged 15-64 years.(31) Paul Demeny, Distinguished Scholar at the Population Council and founder of Population and Development Review, reveals the most shocking statistic:

“…[A]ssuming constancy of Europe’s 2000 fertility rates, a generation of 1000 persons would be replaced by a second generation of 645, followed by a third generation of 416, a fourth of 268, and so on…[The] implied annual rate of growth in the stable population… is minus 1.46 percent per year. Such a rate would bring a population to half of its original size in 47 years.” (32)

Because the consequences of unfavorable demographic trends will last over a period of 50 years, any policy response must represent a concerted effort by all EU members and must go beyond the life of any political cycle. (33)

Meeting the labor demand
Although Europe can expect to receive upward of 40 million immigrants by 2050, this number will still not offset low fertility and growing life expectancy rates. (34) Further exacerbating the labor shortage is the competition among nations for attracting immigrants. Given that Europe competes with other destination countries for skilled migrant workers, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, European business leaders point to the importance of fostering an open society and racial tolerance in an effort to make Europe more attractive than its competitors.

Germany serves as a case in point. Germany became known for increased hate crimes against its foreign population at the same time it made available 20,000 temporary work permits to fill the demand for information technology laborers. After six months, only 5,000 slots were filled. (35) German officials attribute this low response rate to the general perception that German society is intolerant.

Expanding the German situation to the rest of Europe, Rey Koslowski, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, highlights the shortcomings of EU member states’ national policies:

“European states still lag in the social and political incorporation of immigrants. Most continental European states primarily base citizenship on ancestry rather than place of birth. Social and political incorporation of migrants and acceptance of multiculturalism may prove necessary for successful recruitment of high skilled workers.” (36)

Most modern migration policies, at the state level, developed in the context of millions of Europeans leaving their home countries. Thus citizenship laws were tied to laws based on ancestral lineage—jus sanguinis—rather than on place of birth—jus soli; this was in an effort to encourage the return of emigrant children to Europe. (37) Given that European immigration/emigration patterns shifted - rather than a sender of immigrants, Europe now receives them – the institutions that control and monitor immigration have become dysfunctional. (38)

If national governments recognize the inadequacies of the systems in place, an incredible opportunity for creating an integrated immigration policy emerges. By creating an integrated policy, those members with reputations for ethnic intolerance could redefine their image under the scope of the EU.

State Sovereignty: Protecting social, cultural and political authority
“…[T]he larger the number of great powers in the international system the more likely it is to observe [a] lack of cooperation.” (39)           -Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979

In applying Waltz’s statement to the EU, one could say that EU enlargement makes cooperation more difficult, especially when it comes to issues that threaten state sovereignty or national interests. Yet, time and again the European Union shocks political scientists by overcoming the seemingly impossible—its mere evolution from the ECSC to the EU of today proves this point. Since 1951 member states relinquished unimaginable aspects of state sovereignty (i.e. adopting a common currency) to a supranational entity in exchange for regional economic growth and stability. (40) Herein lies the heart of the immigration debate: Does the undeniable need for an improved labor market overshadow the state’s desire to maintain social and political control? Although EU members relinquished several traditional responsibilities to supranational institutions, will they draw the line at immigration policy?

EU members are defensive when it comes to resolving migratory issues in a collective manner. The largest point of contention emanates from the notion of sovereignty – immigration policies are matters of nation, not of community.41 Despite the market logic argued above, the state logic “is trapped between its determination to respect cultural diversity and its desire to control it so that it does not damage the existing social cohesion.” (42) Creating an integrated immigration policy seems inevitable given the EU’s current political arrangements, such as a lack of internal borders; however, the national identity approach mentioned earlier suggests that immigration policies are intertwined with traditional/cultural/historical experiences and migrant laborers.(43)

The Case of Germany
In 1961, Germany signed a labor recruitment agreement with Turkey and granted entry to almost one million Turks. Although they arrived as temporary laborers, most would not return. By 1973, Germany tightened immigration policies and ceased to recruit labor from outside the EU. Nevertheless, the Turkish population continued to grow as a result of family reunification and asylum, (44) both of which fall under the provisions of international and EU law. Perhaps to Germany’s dismay, here we see an example of how the supranational nature of the EU dictated national policy. (45)

By 2001, Turks formed 26.6 percent of the non-national population in Germany; they represented 16 percent of all third country nationals living in the EU-15; and for the last 20 years, they formed the largest immigrant population in the entire EU. (46) Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, German policies failed to acknowledge the permanence of its immigrants and publicly claimed that it was ‘not a country of immigration.’ (47) As a result, German Turks born in Germany (approximately 1.6 million) and Turks residing in Germany for more than 20 years are to this day considered non-German nationals, usually referred to by their legal status of Auslander. (48) Between 1972 and 2001, Germany naturalized only 500,000 Turkish citizens. (49)

Germany and the National Identity Approach
Germany’s immigration and citizenship policies well reflect Eytan Meyers’s national identity approach in several ways. A society’s concept of national identity dictates policy and the extent to which it rejects or absorbs an immigrant class. Meyers’ national identity approach looks at three distinct characteristics that form a nation’s concept of national identity. They point to the differences between: 1) settler societies (having been built by immigrants) and ethnic states (which usually oppose permanent immigration); 2) homogenous cultures (ethnically non-diverse, dominant religion, etc.) and heterogeneous countries (who may base their identity on political criteria, for instance, “We are a democracy”); and 3) countries who base citizenship laws on jus sanguinis (through blood-lines, Germany and Switzerland) and those who base them on jus soli (through birth right, the United States). (50)

Taking a look at Europe’s migratory trends since WWII, we can conclude the following: 1) the recent shift in migration patterns, that of receiving rather than sending immigrants, underscores the notion that while European emigrants fled to create settler societies (U.S., Canada, Australia), European nations preserved ethnic homogeneity; 2) to encourage the return of emigrants (and in turn encourage ethnic homogeneity), European nations devised migration laws based on jus sanguis; and, 3) ultimately, ethnic homogeneity influenced citizenship and migration laws. Today, European states “reject ethnic diversity as a positive societal value…and immigration is seen as a fundamental threat to national unity and the common good.” (51) Given these circumstances, surrendering the close-knit link between national identity and immigration policies to a supranational entity seems impossible.

Despite Germany’s adherence to the national identity approach in immigration policy, it recently made gradual steps toward becoming a self-recognized country of immigration by introducing the Zuwanderungsgesetz. German officials selected this name after much heated debate – the term Zuwanderung implies “ unwanted immigration that is tolerated for constitutional and moral-political reasons.” (52) Among other things, this measure aimed to simplify immigration laws, establish quotas for highly skilled labor migrants and introduce compulsory “integration courses” for new and existing non-nationals who cannot speak German. As implied in the term’s meaning, it comes as no surprise that the German Constitutional Court struck Zuwanderungsgesetz down in 2002. Nevertheless, the law presented a symbolic moment for the Auslander, as it offered permanent non-EU labor migration for the first time since 1973. (53) Today, though certain aspects of the law survived, “German legal reforms have not resolved fundamental tensions over political, socio-economic or cultural inclusion.” (54)

The System is Set Up for Creating an Integrated Policy

Immigration and the First Pillar
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty devised the three-pillar, decision-making structure of the European Union. Under the first pillar we find economic, social, and environmental policies—this pillar deals with all integrated, supranational matters including those relating to the Single Market and the free movement of persons across borders. The second pillar, known as the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar, hosts foreign policy and military concerns, while the third pillar, that of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (formerly known as the pillar of Justice and Home Affairs), encompasses police cooperation and international criminal law. (55)

Once under the pillar of Justice and Home Affairs, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam transferred the Schengen Agreements and “the entire area of visas, asylum and immigration issues” from intergovernmental cooperation to the jurisdiction of the first pillar. (56) Although immigration policies fall under the first pillar,

“EU cooperation on migration and asylum still favors intergovernmental bargains over supranational institutional actors. Clearly, the nature and outcome of these institutional conflicts influence the prospects for a common immigration policy in the EU. It is precisely in areas such as the second and third pillars (foreign policy, security, justice) or “high politics” arenas that member-states are most reluctant to forego national traditions, interests and sovereignty.”(57)

Implications of the EU Constitution

On 29 October 2004, the EU-25 signed a treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe. Within the proposed Constitution, five articles and four protocols concerned issues of border control, immigration, and asylum policy. While the fate of the EU Constitution (a topic beyond the scope of this paper) is unclear, at the very least it brought EU-wide problems to the forefront, including immigration policy. (58)

For instance, the proposal brings in Schengen Acquis under the scope of the EU, which clearly indicates that Schengen member states are willing to cede sovereignty over border control to a supranational authority. (59)

The most important objective of the EU Constitution simplifies the decision-making process by abolishing the three-pillar structure and giving the Commission the exclusive right to handle most justice and home affairs issues. This means that no single country could block progress on shared problems like cross-border crime, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration.(60)

Conclusion
Immigration policy embodies the bittersweet relationship between member states’ desires to preserve national identity and their commitment to deepen and widen the European Union. Nevertheless, the drafting of the EU Constitution; the moving of immigration policy from the third to the first pillar; the changing immigration laws in Germany; and the growing concern over demographic trends all seem to foreshadow the inevitability of an integrated immigration policy.

Europe will be challenged in creating this policy as it undergoes two distinct yet related identity crises: 1) It must accept its new demographic make-up – as a receiver of immigrants, EU member states are becoming heterogeneous societies; and 2) it must reconcile the tension between preserving socio-cultural authority and ceding sovereignty to the Union. Upon embracing their new identity, EU member states can manage cultural diversity by creating multicultural democracies and citizenship. (61) Indeed, socio-cultural authority and integrated immigration policy do not necessarily work against each other and member states do not have to trade one for the other.


Notes
1. Addo, Atta. “Europe: Porous Policies,” Harvard International Review. Cambridge: Fall 2006. Vol. 28, Issue 3; p10, 2 pages.

2. The EU-15 members states are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland (Republic of), Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

3. Immigration policy regulates: “access to the territory of a state and to selected sectors, most notably the labor market:” determines which migrants may enter; and dictates what the migrant can do within the host country (Hartnell, Helen Elizabeth, “Belonging: Citizenship and Migration in the European Union and in Germany,” Berkeley Journal of International Law. Berkeley: 2006. Vol. 24, Iss. 1; pg 361)

4. Lahav, Preface and Acknowledgements xiv

5. ibid

6. Koslowski, Rey, “Immigration, Border Control and Aging Societies in the European Union,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs. Volume VIII, Issue 2; Winter 2002, pg 175

7. ibid

8. ibid

9. Pichelmann, Karl and Werner Roeger, “The EU Growth Strategy and the Impact of Aging,” Review of International Economics. 12(2), 2004 pg 224

10. Carone, Giuseppe and Declan Costello, “Can Europe Afford to Grow Old?” Finance & Development. Washington: Sep 2006. Vol. 43, Iss. 3; pg. 28

11. Meyers, Eytan, “Theories of International Immigration Policy – A Comparative Analysis,” International Migration Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter 2000), pg 1251 (1245-1282) http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=01979183%28200024%2934%3A4%3C1245%3 ATOIIPC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y (accessed 1/24/07)

12. In 2004, newly elected socialist president Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero granted amnesty to an estimated 800,000 illegal immigrants living in Spain and its territories. As a result, formerly undocumented workers were able to contribute to the formal tax system. The Spanish government attributes the 3 percent growth in social security funds to Zapatero’s amnesty policies. (Sanchez, Marcela “Vale la pena mirar el experimento migratorio de España,” Washington Post. October 13, 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2005/10/13/AR2005101300960.html?nav=rss_opinion/columns, (accessed 1/18/07).

13. Article 48, Title III Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital, Treaty of Rome, 1948. http://www.hri.org/docs/Rome57/Part3Title03.html (accessed 11/28/06).

14. Martín, Carmela, The Spanish Economy in the New Europe, Macmillan Press Ltd. Great Britain, 2000 pg. 191

15. ibid

16. In 1961 Germany signed a labor recruitment agreement with Turkey. By 1973 almost one million Turks arrived as temporary laborers. When Germany ceased to recruit labor from outside the EU in the early 1970s, the majority of Turks settled in Germany and started a family reunification process. (Al-Shahi, Ahmed & Richard Lawless, Middle East and North African Immigrants in Europe, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, New York, NY. 2005, pg 5)

17. McLaren, Lauren M., “Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants,” Social Forces, Vol. 81, No. 3 March, 2003 pg 909 (909-936), http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00377732%28200303%2981%3A3%3C909%3AAPIE CT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q (accessed 1/24/06).

18. Alemany, Jesús María, [et. al], La inmigración, una realidad en España/Seminario de Investigación para la Paz, Centro Pignatelli, ed. Zaragoza, 2002 pg 28

19. McLaren, p910.

20. Bade, p275.

21. “A body of law which has to be applied by all Member States applying the Schengen provisions and which countries seeking EU membership must adopt into their own national legislation.” (Abolition of Internal Borders and Creation of a Single EU External Frontier. August, 2005 http://ec.europa.eu/ justicehome/fsj/freetravel/frontiers/fsj_freetravel_ schengen_en.htm (accessed, 1/20/07)).

22. Abolition of Internal Borders and Creation of a Single EU External Frontier. August, 2005 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/freetravel/frontiers/fsj_freetravel_schengen_en.htm (accessed, 1/20/07).

23. The Schengen Acquis “Decision of the Executive Committee of 27 October 1998 on the Adoption of Measures to Fight Illegal Immigration,”: as referred to in Article 1(2) of Council Decision 1999/435/ED of May 1999. September 22, 2000, pg 203 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2000/l_239/l_23920000922en00010473.pdf (accessed 1/20/07).

24. Koslowski, p174.

25. ibid p29.

26. ibid

27. Martín, Carmela, The Spanish Economy in the New Europe, Macmillan Press Ltd. Great Britain, 2000 pg. 191

28. Carone and Costello, pg. 28

29. Eurostat Old-age-dependency ratio and Financial Times Information Limited – Europe Intelligence Wire Business and Finance, “Coming of Age.” October 5, 2006 http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=2a8fb7b498ea0acb49665ba02a6139f7&_docnum=21&wchp= dGLbVlb-zSkVb&_md5=50fc5ae25572854970096b95968fdfe2 (accessed 1/21/07).

30. Koslowski, p175.

31. ibid p177.

32. Demeny, Paul, “Population Policy Dilemmas in Europe at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 1. March, 2003 pg 3 (1-28 pgs).

33. Financial Times Information Limited – Europe Intelligence Wire Business and Finance, “Coming of Age.” October 5, 2006 http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe/document?_m=2a8fb7b498ea0acb49665ba02a6139f7&_docnum=21&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVb&_md5=50fc5ae25572854970096b95968fdfe2 (accessed 1/21/07).

34. Carone and Costello, p28.

35. Koslowski, p179.

36. ibid p178.

37. ibid p172.

38. Koslowski, Rey p173.

39. Ugur , Mehmet, “Freedom of Movement vs. Exculsion: A reinterpretation of the ‘Insider-Outsider’ Divide in the European Union.” International Migration Review, Center for Migration Studies, NY, Winter 1995. p 965.

40. Lahav, p27.

41. oig Martínez, Juan Manuel, Derechos y libertades de los inmigrantes en España. Una vision constitucional, jurisprudencial y legislative, Editorial Universitas Internacional, S.L. Madrid, Spain. 2004, pg 19.

42. Al-Shahi, Ahmed and Richard Lawless, Middle East and North African Immigrants in Europe. Routeledge Taylor & Francis Group, New York, NY; 2005, pg 30.

43. Meyers, p1252.

44. Al-Shahi and Lawless, p5.

45. Hartnell, Helen Elizabeth, “Belonging: Citizenship and Migration in the European Union and in Germany,” Berkeley Journal of International Law. Berkeley: 2006. Vol. 24, Iss. 1; pg 388.

46. Al-Shahi and Lawless, p310.

47. ibid

48. ibid, p131.

49. ibid

50. Meyers, p1254-1255.

51. ibid

52. Hartnell, p387.

53. Al-Shahi and Lawless, p145.

54. Hartnell, p398.

55. Swedish government website.http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/eu_info/korthet_pelare. asp#pillars (accessed 1/25/07).

56. Bade, p291.

57. Lahav, p157.

58. European Commission José Manuel Barroso: The European Constitution, European Council, Strasbourg, 15 June 2006 http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/press_office/speeches-press_releases/council0606_en.htm (accessed 1/24/07).

59. Population Council, “The European Union Constitution on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration,” Population and Development Review. Vol. 30, Iss. 4, December 2004. pg 790 http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0098-7921%28200412%2930%3A4%3C789%3ATEUCOB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O (accessed 1/24/07).

60. Directorate-General of Justice and Home Affairs, “European Constitution: Bringing together the EU treaties.”

61. Al-Shahi and Lawless, p41.




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14. Eurostat Old-age-dependency ratio

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20. Martín, Carmela, The Spanish Economy in the New Europe, Macmillan Press Ltd. Great Britain, 2000

21. McLaren, Lauren M., “Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants,” Social Forces, Vol.81, No.3, March 2003 (909-936)

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23. Pichelmann, Karl and Werner Roeger, “The EU Growth Strategy and the Impact of Aging,” Review of International Economics. 12(2), 2004

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About the author
Born in Argentina and raised in Los Angeles, Sofia Perazzo double majored in Political Science and Global Affairs at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Currently, she is a 2nd year Global Affairs student concentrating in the Private Sector. Upon graduation, she hopes to forge a career in Corporate Responsibility.