VOLUME 1, ISSUE 2 — SPRING 2007

China’s rapidly growing economy and accompanying military buildup, along with a renewed groundswell of nationalism in Russia under Vladimir Putin, have proved to be cause for concern among many traditional realists within the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Donald Rumsfeld’s overhaul of the military and the “Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)” appear more designed for a possible conflagration in the Taiwan Straits than for a prolonged insurgency in the back alleys of Mogadishu.

Realists are correct in that states continue to be the main actors in the contemporary international system. However, they are not the only actors. In the post- Cold War era, the realist paradigm is being called into question by the erosion of the traditional Westphalian nation- state and the changing nature of the notion of sovereignty. As a byproduct of globalization, the state is being supplanted by an amalgamation of transnational actors, including multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, terrorist groups, criminal/mafia syndicates, and powerful interest groups. The slow but steady metamorphosis of the nation-state has drastic implications for the shape that conflicts will take in the future.

In their well-crafted and timely tome Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, Richard Schultz and Andrea Dew provide an in-depth and thorough analysis of the changing nature of warfare. Their analysis focuses not only on why wars are fought; but, perhaps more importantly, on how they are fought. The book aims to afford policymakers and military planners with detailed accounts of contemporary conflicts that will aid them in drawing comparisons and imagining solutions to present day and future battles.

The authors’ overarching theme is that the Western notion of conventional warfare is undergoing considerable change. With the exception of Desert Storm and the first phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the major conflicts of the post- Cold War era have pitted technologically advanced, well-supplied, and trained militaries against poorly equipped, ad-hoc militias comprised of tribes, clans and ethnic militias. Shultz and Dew argue that this trend is likely to persist.

Bemoaning the realists’ assertions that states are the primary actors in international relations—and thus the most nefarious threats—Shultz and Dew frown upon the narrow focus of state-centric thinkers regarding the potential danger represented by a rising China or a resurgent Russia. Today’s most odious international security challenges, argue the authors, are much more likely to be posed by armed non-state actors operating in semi-lawless regions with a minimum or complete absence of state authority. Indeed, the authors note that many of the internecine ethnic conflicts that raged throughout the 1990s were a result of “failing states where various ethnic communities were linked by little more than geography.”1

This threat was perhaps best captured by the American military’s misadventure in Somalia in 1993, which resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers and hundreds of Somalis. As a result, the term “Somalia syndrome” has become all too familiar in the American press and policy circles, often used in the context of U.S. reluctance to become involved in humanitarian missions deemed too dangerous. This label has since been applied to the American failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide as well as to the dearth of action taken on the deteriorating situation in Darfur.

Through four comprehensive case studies on Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the authors emphasize the sine qua non of any sound military strategy—Sun Tzu’s time-tested advice—“know thy enemy.” The choice to eschew this maxim, in each of the four cases examined, contributes significantly to the difficulties experienced by modern militaries in fighting armed non-state groups.As a framework, Shultz and Dew use six indicators to measure the efficacy of any successful military operation: the concept of warfare; the organization of command and control; the area of operations (AO); the types and targets of operations; the constraints and limitations; and the role of external actors. The indicators are applied as benchmarks to Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq to emphasize the range of fighting tactics utilized by the myriad of tribes, clans and groups in these countries. No two groups are alike, and any attempt to generalize the enemy or take these groups for granted is a dangerous proposition.

This robust assessment of enemy capabilities is the crux of the book. The authors draw on the work of culturalist Adda Bozeman in attempting to debunk another realist notion: only force matters. On the contrary, understanding the culture and background of one’s enemy is of the utmost importance in battle. Without this knowledge, the nature of the enemy becomes obfuscated and a military becomes more vulnerable as a result.

Shultz and Dew, drawing on a wealth of examples from the case studies, illustrate how modern militaries could have avoided much of the trouble they encountered had they simply researched the historical background and contemporary political developments in the target countries. In one instance, the authors offer a scathing indictment of the failure of U.S. military planners to research the Somali way of life. If they had, the authors contend, they would have discovered that “throughout Somali history different clans had joined together to oppose foreign intervention.”2 Furthermore, the authors argue violence was less of a strategic tactic than it was a way of life. As such, “force and the threat of force are always present.”3

In Chechnya, the Russians’ gaffe was a result of historical ignorance as well as strategic and tactical military blunders. First, Shultz and Dew observe, the Russians failed to comprehend traditional Chechen society and way of life. The Chechens value military and war-fighting skills as a top priority in their culture and the prototypical Chechen warrior “believes he is worth ten of his foes and will fight to the death rather than shame his family, clan, or ethnic nation.”4 Moreover, the short historical memory of the Russian leaders failed to account for the more than 200 years of Moscow’s mostly brutal attempt to rule these fiercely independent people. Finally, the authors note the significance of Sufism in understanding the Chechen way of war. Together, along with an ancient warrior tradition and a history of fervid resistance, Sufism helped form what Shultz and Dew describe as “the foundation for the system of beliefs and values that inspire dogged and protracted resistance.”5 If Moscow bothered to do their homework, they may not have suffered so dearly at the hands of Shamil Basayev and the Chechens.

Afghanistan, or “the graveyard of empires” as it is commonly known, has historically been “easy to invade but impossible to hold,” according to Shultz and Dew. In this case study, however, the authors give credit to the United States for taking heed of the lessons of history by studying the failed occupations of both the British and the former Soviet Union during the war they launched to depose the Taliban in late 2001. U.S. special forces were sent in prior to the ground invasion to work with Northern Alliance troops in readying the way for the subsequent intervention.

Any success the U.S. may have achieved early on in Afghanistan was negated by the gross incompetence displayed by the Bush Administration in its planning of the Iraq war. Much has been written about the duplicitous intentions of the “neocon cabal,” but the stark reality is that the American government failed in Iraq because they lacked an intimate knowledge of the conditions they were likely to face once the initial invasion was over. War planners eschewed the history and culture of the area and instead relied on analysis from people like Ahmed Chalabi, who had spent all of his time in London, not Baghdad, and who proved to be dangerously out of touch with the situation on the ground in Iraq.

The Americans were utterly unprepared for the insurgency, which Dew and Shultz note American military planners would have seen coming had they studied Iraqi history, especially contemporary Iraqi history. The authors produce an original graphic detailing the “Elements of Iraq’s Insurgency” which formed the majority of resistance to American forces. Sunni Arab rejectionists and former regime elements comprise the bulk of the graphic, with Sunni Iraq Islamists, foreign Islamists, organized crime, financial facilitators, and Sadr/Shiite extremists completing the puzzle.

By analyzing these groups, the authors conclude that “the insurgency was predictable and parts of it, at least, were preventable.” Rather than attempting to prove a nexus between al-Qaeda and Iraq, the Bush Administration should have been diligently focusing on those factors at play within Iraq. This could have led the U.S. to secure law and order after the fall of Saddam and thus deprived these groups with the community support that is essential to any prolonged insurgent or terrorist activity. Furthermore, American planners should have been quicker to realize the beginning of an insurgency based on the way it was being fought, with the use of improvised explosive devices (IED), suicide bombings, hostage- taking, assassinations, and beheadings.

Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias is a manifesto on the most crucial aspects of the way wars are now being fought in the post- Cold War era. The case studies detail the geographic locations, cultural underpinnings, and geopolitical circumstances of some of the most important battles waged between top-rate militaries and third world warriors. However, the most important contribution of this book—and indeed its purpose—is to inform the reader of the way wars have been fought between modern militaries and non-traditional forces, including terrorists, insurgents, and militias. In writing this book, the authors have successfully provided their target audience—“U.S. policymakers, their advisers, and operational planners”—with the knowledge they need to be victorious in battle against enemy forces employing asymmetric tactics as a method of warfare. Will future policymakers and planners recognize the dangers posed by these new warriors of contemporary combat? Or will insurgents, terrorists, and militias continue to be marginalized as governments remain focused on great power rivalries? Stay tuned for answers to these questions.

Notes
1. Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew. Inurgents, Terrorists and Militias: The warriors of contemporary combat (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 32.

2. ibid., 82.

3. ibid., 63.

4. ibid., 107.

5. ibid., 138.


About the reviewer
Colin P. Clarke graduated from Loyola College in Maryland in 2002 where he studied history, political science, and writing. As an undergraduate, he also spent a semester at the National University of Ireland, Galway, studying the government and politics of Northern Ireland, focusing specifically on the aftermath of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Clarke will graduate this May from NYU’s Center for Global Affairs with an M.S. in International Relations, having spent most of his time at CGA studying U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, international security, and global terrorism. Clarke will begin doctoral studies next fall at the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA), where he hopes to earn a Ph.D. in Foreign Policy and International Security while researching Islamic terrorism and the future of Iraq.