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Blind Peer Review Process: Please send ONE piece per submission to pgisubmit@gmail.com. All identifying details will be removed by the designated email checker and sent out to the PGI Editorial Board. Once the submission has been reviewed, the designated email checker will connect the Editorial Board to the author for comments. If the necessary changes to prepare the piece to publication standards are beyond the interest or time constraints of the author, up to THREE submissions per academic year will be accepted, with a maximum of one publication.

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Deadline for submissions throughout the academic year: APRIL 1, 2013. We will accept papers as we receive them through the academic year. Monthly, we will post articles online. At the close of the academic year, a selection of papers published online will be included in a hard copy journal. Submissions received after the semester has formally closed will be reviewed for the 2012-2013 academic year.

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On June 15th, TrustLaw released a global perception poll of academics, aid professionals, health workers, policy makers, journalists, and development specialists on what in their opinion would be the five most dangerous countries in the world for women. The poll was based upon the levels of discrimination, sexual violence, health, cultural/customary practices, non-sexual violence, and trafficking prevalent in countries across the globe.

The title of worst place in the world to be a woman according to TrustLaw’s global perception poll was given to Afghanistan based upon health, economic/discrimination, and non-sexual violence indicators. Indeed, Afghanistan suffers from massive gender inequality that typically transcends ethnic, socio-economic, and tribal lines and virtually makes the Afghan constitution a meaningless resource for women in obtaining and protecting their rights. The fact that Afghanistan managed to top this list raises several questions about the almost 10 years of international intervention and what lies ahead for Afghanistan and Afghan women with the future exodus of foreign troops.

Although TrustLaw’s poll is highly debated, what is important about this poll is the fact that it exists, that it is sparking global debate, and that it is putting the dangers women face on the international news radar. What remains to be seen is if this poll will spark more than just debate and result in much needed action.

To view TrustLaw’s danger poll please check out:

http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/poll-results-worlds-five-most-dangerous-countries-for-women-2011/

http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/womens-rights/dangerpoll/

By Regina Joseph

This is the second in a series of posts leading up to the CGA Scenarios Initiative’s conference on Pakistan in 2020. As we examine Pakistan’s drivers of change–economic and political, internal and external–we’ll continue to update the blog with information on Pakistan’s current conditions, as well as variability for the next decade.

Pakistan’s political scene inhabits a certain dualism. While the churn of constantly morphing coalitions and political parties constitutes the most visible aspect of Pakistan’s federal parliamentary democracy, citizens and politicians alike know that real political power is concentrated in the hands of Pakistan’s military.  The military has held power in Pakistan for more combined years than a civilian government, stalling political development in the name of security threats.  Today, the civilian government defers to the military’s decisions on security related issues, and the military is thought to have wide control over Pakistan’s foreign policy orientation.  Still, democracy has always been seen by Pakistanis as their natural political system, and military rulers have had to legitimate their positions through elections (though criticism abounds regarding the fairness of these votes).

While Pakistani politics is represented by a multitude of parties (over 18 at the time of the last elections in 2008), two dynastic family clans have dominated the government for more than two decades. The left-leaning Bhutto-Zardari clan leads the incumbent People’s Parliamentarian Party (PPP), with Asif Ali Zardari (the widower of slain former President Benazir Bhutto and a Shia muslim) currently serving as President. The right-leaning Sharif family clan is represented by the increasingly popular Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Group (PML-N), Pakistan’s largest opposition party and the domain of Nawaz Sharif—a former Prime Minister of Pakistan, a Sunni Muslim and crafty political survivor.

Despite sectarianism and deep mistrust between the two clans and their parties, the PPP and PML-N joined forces in a tenuous political coalition just prior to the 2008 elections, to counter then-president General Pervez Musharraf. However, the coalition between the two fell apart in March of 2011, amid accusations of Zardari corruption and PML-N’s strong resistance both to reforming the blasphemy laws and allowing a strong US presence in Pakistan (highlighted by the recent capture and release of alleged spy Raymond Davis). Observers of the political scene warily eye Nawaz Sharif’s ascendance over Zardari’s increasingly tenuous grasp on power, pipping Sharif and his PML-N party as the leading candidates for the upcoming election in 2013.

Perhaps no one eyes this development more warily than General Ashfaq Kayani, the Chief of Army Staff for Pakistan’s Army and the man deemed more powerful than the President. A former Director General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, Kayani is generally perceived as highly competent and impervious to the political grappling that characterizes Pakistan’s political parties. Kayani has allegedly told US officials that he dislikes and does not respect Zardari, but also expressed larger anxiety over Sharif, whom he views with deep distrust. Kayani’s own star has suffered over his handling of the Raymond Davis case and a recent drone strike that called into question what many Pakistanis perceive as a too-cosy relationship between Kayani and the US.

As Pakistan edges closer to elections in 2013, the current political scene presents a multitude of potential scenarios, and considerable challenges to US foreign policy in South Asia:

–Should Sharif and the PML-N emerge from the opposition to become the winning party in 2013, their vocal repudiation of an American presence in Pakistan (and known support of Taliban and terrorist groups) could pose serious difficulties for the US, not only in term of the current conflict in Afghanistan, but also on a larger geopolitical level in South Asia, especially as it pertains to US ally India

–A Sharif-led government could lead to a confrontation with Kayani and the Pakistani army, either directly or indirectly—with no issue more potentially explosive than the current support that Kayani and the Army have provided to the US

– Saudi Arabia, a key financier and ally to Pakistan, may prefer military rule in Pakistan to a Zardari/PPP government—which they hold in high contempt—but they are also partial to a Sharif-led government (Nawaz Sharif ruled the PML in exile from Saudi Arabia). Given the current strains in the current US-Saudi relationship, Saudi support of an openly anti-US president in Pakistan could pose enormous obstacles for America

Pakistan’s political development will be a significant driver of change in the next decade.  Both party politics and civil-military relations provide a wide range of variability for Pakistan’s future, and will interact with economic, security and identity developments to produce an end-state for Pakistan in 2020.  What will shape the strengths or weaknesses of democratic institutiosn?  How will party politics affect identity formation and contribute to economic stability or instability? Will the military’s influence wane over the next decade, or will security concerns drive a military takeover?  Leave us a comment below and tell us how you see Pakistan’s political development to 2020.

By: Gordon Little and Katherine Kokkinos

This is the first in a series of posts leading up to the CGA Scenarios Initiative’s conference on Pakistan in 2020.  As we examine Pakistan’s drivers of change–economic and political, internal and external–we’ll continue to update the blog with information on Pakistan’s current conditions, as well as variability for the next decade.  For more information on the Scenarios Initiative, please visit www.cgascenarios.wordpress.com

There are 185 million or so people in Pakistan (most of them in rural areas), but economic disarray, terrorism and poor foreign relations are barriers to the peoples’ economic opportunity. The country’s problems are integrated with those of its region, so the fate of Pakistan both shapes and is shaped by its immediate surroundings. Understanding its predicaments is crucial to getting acquainted with US foreign policy challenges across South Asia.

According to Business Monitor International, “unless Pakistan’s security and core infrastructure situation dramatically improves, it is difficult to envisage a big pick up in international interest over the near term”. Indeed, the sharp rise in the number of incidents of terrorism is estimated at a cumulative loss to the economy of $43 billion since 2005. Lost exports, damaged physical infrastructure, diversion of budgetary resources to military and security-related spending, capital and human flight, and high inflation are just a few effects of the violence on Pakistan’s economy.

Experts note that poor economic conditions are conducive to terrorist recruitment strategies, but terrorism constrains economic growth.  Pakistan (with help from allies) will have to find a way to break this cycle of violence and poverty.  Recent US proposals, such as the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation, do not address fundamental incompatibilities with domestic needs and are seen locally as more beneficial to the United States than the Pakistani people.

Pakistan also suffers from an energy crisis, where current electricity generation capacity meets less than 80% of demand, and where energy prices increased by 15% last year. A leading driver of this unsustainable incapacity is rampant circular debt. Circular debt occurs when there is an imbalance between cash inflows and outflows – in other words, problems in the cash inflow of one entity cascade down to other segments of the payments chain. In Pakistan’s case, end-consumer tariffs were insufficient to recover the rising costs of power generation. Because of fiscal constraints, the government was not fully compensating Pepco–Pakistan’s core distribution entity in the energy sector–against the resulting losses. So Pepco began borrowing from banks in 2006 to compensate for the non-receipt of tariff subsidies from the government. But Pepco cannot repay the loans without becoming profitable…and so the circle goes.

The cumulative effect of this energy crisis on Pakistan’s economy was 2% of GDP in 2009-10. Additional energy-related challenges include volatile international oil prices, which further pressure the cost structure in Pakistan’s power generation sector.  Without reliable energy, how can businesses expand?

The competitiveness of Pakistani goods and services is also dwindling. Its share of world exports declined over the last decade from 0.16% in 2002 to 0.13% in 2008, largely due to the security situation within the country. Some analysts are hopeful about recent talks of increasing trade with India, Afghanistan and China. However, the scant investment that currently takes place may actually be harming Pakistani business opportunities. For instance, China has begun to invest in construction and nuclear plants in Pakistan, decreasing the competitiveness of Pakistani goods in these sectors on their home soil. By and large, foreign direct investment is on the decline: FDI in FY09 totaled $3.2 billion as compared with $1.8 billion in FY10–these figures represent a 45% decline.

Pakistan relies on foreign aid to cover budgetary gaps. The International Monetary Fund implemented a US$11.3 billion Standby Arrangement (SBA) in November of 2008, though it is set to expire later this year. Under the agreement, Pakistan must meet a range of requirements around restoring financial stability, providing social safety nets, and raising budgetary revenues through tax reforms, though the awful 2010 floods have made it difficult to meet these ambitions. If Pakistan cannot meet its requirements, the IMF could pull out of the agreement. Where will Pakistan get the funding it needs? Is foreign aid being productively spent when it can’t change core economic problems? Will foreign investment, such as that from China, be able to supplant it, and what would this mean for Pakistan’s economy?

Other structural economic challenges that confront Pakistan, which we will research further over the course of the project, include:

~high budget deficits (expected at 6% for the current fiscal year)

~low tax-to-GDP ratio (10% in 2010)

~low investment spending (about 15.7% in 2010, as compared with India at 36%)

~poor educational facilities and education sub-sector spending

~high government corruption

~high food prices

~low productivity and an overall decline in agricultural sector–Pakistan’s largest employing sector

We consider economics a major driver of change as we imagine possible scenarios for Pakistan in 2020.  Without economic growth, many goals for Pakistan and the region cannot be realized. Where do you think Pakistan should focus its resources?  Are there any solutions for Pakistan’s economic constraints? What can the world community do to help? Leave a comment below and tell us what you consider to be Pakistan’s economic obstacles and opportunities.

Oil is yet again negatively affecting the global economy and as prices continue to escalate, the stability of the modest economic recovery is thought to be in jeopardy.

After 18 days of protests leading to Hosni Mubarak vacating his post of Egyptian president on February 11th and the uprising in Libya resulting in 100s of deaths at the hands of Moammar Gadhafi, questions have focused not only about the nations’ political and social futures, but also on oil markets (but barely news about food prices). Such a focus should highlight the need to be weaned off of the liquid.

Initially, The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 threw oil markets for a wild ride, launching Brent Crude over $100/barrel for the first time since 2008. However, when analyzing the data, the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean (Sumed) pipeline are not essential for oil transit, nor is Egypt an oil player.

In 2010, tankers transited the Suez averaging less than 1 million barrels per day (bpd). Also in 2010, the Sumed pipeline accounted for 1.15 million bpd of crude oil flows. Globally, close to 88 million bpd are supplied, Egypt produces 660,000 bpd and is a net importer. Furthermore, if the Suez or Sumed were closed, tankers could be directed around the Cape of Good Hope, adding time and cost to trips, but not an insurmountable obstacle with the expanded use of very large and ultra large crude carriers.

However, Libya, the first oil exporting nation to be engulfed in the political upheaval, has sent further shocks to oil markets. Brent Crude is near $120/barrel and is anticipated to continue to increase as the unrest persists. Energy companies working in Libya have evacuated staff members and halted some work. There is also uncertainty if Gadhafi will sabotage the wells or if rebels will cease shipments causing further market disruption. This price spike also partly reflects fear that the unrest could move to larger producers, again proving that markets will act first and think later.

Libya has the largest oil reserves in Africa, estimated to tally 44 billion barrels, which stretches from the Mediterranean into the Sahara. It is the 3rd largest exporter on the continent and 12th largest globally with 1.6 million bpd of light, sweet crude, 79% of which goes directly to Europe. To attempt to stabilize the new shortages, Saudi Arabia is discussing increasing oil supply to Europe or increasing its supply to Asia while West African oil is rerouted to Europe.

These breathing case studies lead to question what if the unrest does reach the House of Saud, where King Abdullah offered $36 billion in benefits to the population in hopes of staving off protests, or if the shipping channel through the Straight of Hormuz is closed off? Will oil jump to $150, $175, over $200/barrel and plant the seed to reverse the economic recovery?

While the effects of the uprisings are now beginning to eat into our wallets at the pump, it is important to remember the narrative should not be focused solely through the lens of the impact on oil. It should continue to spotlight the quest for the freedoms and dignity that people are demanding.