The Conflict in Kosovo: A Humanitarian War
By Matthew Koppe
In 1994, the United Nations Development Program released a report that described two legs of human security, one in which the state refrains from abusing its citizens and the other in which the state is actively involved in the welfare of the citizen.[1] The conflict in Kosovo is an example of the international community stepping in to preserve the former. The Yugoslav province of Kosovo was granted limited autonomy in the 1960s and 1970s by Josif Tito, in order to manage the antagonistic relationship between Kosovar Serbs and Albanians who existed separately in this same region. However, Tito’s death in 1980, and the subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia aggravated old ethnic tensions throughout the region. An opportunistic and nationalistic politician Slobodan Milošević became president of Serbia, ending semi-autonomous status for Kosovo and infuriating the majority Albanian population.
| “The Albanians referred to their ancient Illyrian ancestors, while the Serbs claimed that they were lead to Kosovo by God. Serbs claimed that the Albanians arrived during the Ottoman conquest.” |
This led to conflict between Kosovar Serbs, who were supported by Belgrade, and Kosovar Albanians, some of whom formed militias, including the radical Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), to fight for independence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) entered the fray after the failure of repeated international diplomacy with Serbia. What were the causes behind this conflict? How did NATO proceed in this conflict? What lessons were learned during the conflict? The NATO decision to launch an air campaign against Serbian forces was designed to achieve humanitarian and political conditions, and was a conflict in which NATO allies learned several valuable lessons.
Causes of Conflict
NATO underestimated the importance of Kosovo to the ethnic mythologies of Serbs and Albanians, whose long history of territorial claim to the Balkans was one cause of the conflict. The Albanians referred to their ancient Illyrian ancestors, while the Serbs claimed that they were lead to Kosovo by God.[2] Serbs claimed that the Albanians arrived during the Ottoman conquest. Centuries later, the Serb-Albanian discord was exacerbated by Tito’s decision to defuse the Kosovo situation, and nullify any potential separatist movements by extending certain liberties such as education in the Albanian language and government participation. However, Kosovar Albanians resented what they perceived as Serbian “paternalism” and were offended by their classification as a nationality, in comparison to other ethnic groups who had the status of nations within Yugoslavia.[3] Grievances between Serbs and Albanians were rife for conflict, and laid the foundation for the rise of Milošević. He advocated violent confrontational nationalism as a strategy to gain support for a powerful Serbia as well as a means to advance himself, his authority, and his program.[4] The situation was immediately antagonized when Milošević relegated Kosovo to Serbian control. The Albanians initially responded with “passive resistance,” and, then, announced their independence in 1991.[5] Milošević would not allow this, continuing Serbian brutality against Albanians. The depth of hatred and violence between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, who did not even share a common language, was so deep-seated that Albanians, who endured inferior treatment, felt the time was right to separate from Serbia.[6] By the mid 1990s, the Albanian resistance established an unofficial parallel government, whose most radical elements joined the KLA that waged a guerilla war against Serbs. Milošević brutally reacted, using the Yugoslav Army to assail the KLA, and, technically, cleanse Kosovo of Albanians by killing thousands, seizing property, and forcing a mass migration. These events led the trans-Atlantic community to consider what actions could be taken to curtail this catastrophe.
To prevent confrontation from becoming conflict, diplomacy was attempted. The object was partly motivated by a desire to preserve lives and restore the rights of minorities. Initially, Milošević refused to negotiate, while the KLA further contributed to a worsening situation.[7] Diplomatic disappointments as well as the concern that events could easily spiral out of control, with Milošević destabilizing the entire region, were two other causes of the conflict. Therefore, in 1998 the North Atlantic Council sent NATO Secretary General Solana, General Naumann, American diplomats Holbrooke and Hill, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Clark to negotiate Milošević’s removal of his troops from Kosovo, the end of brutal treatment of Albanians, and the repatriation of refugees.[8] To support these diplomatic efforts, the UN Security Council (UNSC) agreed to Resolution 1199. The Resolution invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is used to address threats to international peace and security, demanding an end to hostilities, improvement of humanitarian conditions, and negotiations.[9] The Kosovo Verification Mission, which was composed of unarmed observers, monitored Serb compliance with these demands. Intimidated by multinational resolve, Serbia promised to comply with NATO demands and the Security Council Resolution as well as to reduce its force strength in Kosovo.
The international diplomatic effort to address Kosovo foundered when Milošević maintained the Serb presence in Kosovo, defying the NATO agreement. The Yugoslav Army continued fighting the KLA. Humanitarians also expressed concern that Kosovar Albanians were looking for refuge in frigid wooded areas, where winter temperatures could result in countless deaths.[10] The Contact Group, composed of the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, Italy, and Germany made one final effort at negotiation between the Serbs and Albanians at Rambouillet, France. The proposed agreement gave Kosovo a greater degree of autonomy, provided for a three-year NATO deployment in the province, removed the Serb regular army, except for the border guard, provided NATO with complete authority in Kosovo, gave NATO unrestricted military access including basing rights through all of Yugoslavia, and called for a referendum at the end of three years to decide.[11] Though the Serbs could accept a return to Kosovo’s pre-1990 autonomy, they could not accept a NATO presence in Kosovo and rejected the Rambouillet Accords. Milošević also felt NATO lacked the political will, and believed he could create a “wedge” between members.[12] When diplomacy failed, NATO and Serbia crossed over from confrontation to conflict.
The Alliance At War
NATO sought to achieve two conditions by elevating the level of engagement from aggressive confrontation to conflict with Serbia: providing humanitarian aid to the population, and creating a political settlement that was favorable to the interests of NATO member states.[13] The humanitarian objective was to help those who were victims of atrocities, not appearing as a force of occupation, and gaining the trust of Kosovar Albanians. The immediate political objective was the eviction of the Yugoslav Army, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo and their subsequent replacement by NATO troops. To achieve these conditions, NATO initiated Operation Allied Force on March 23, 1999. This strategic bombing campaign was expected to succeed in a few days by coercing Belgrade’s compliance with alliance objectives. While the bombing campaign was a tactical success as the various sorties hit fixed and mobile targets, NATO did not have a secondary initiative to deal with Serbian defiance. When it became evident that bombing would have to be prolonged and extensive, two additional challenges arose for NATO: achieving both unanimous agreement among nineteen members and the commitment of American commanders to one course of action.[14] At the strategic level, there was constant consultation and deliberation about force levels, if there should be a total reliance on air power, and where to concentrate the bombing attacks. General Clark felt that targeting Serbian ground troops who were involved in ethnic cleansing was as important as infrastructure bombing while USAF Lieutenant General Short wanted to focus on strategic sites in Belgrade.[15] Ultimately, Clark, who was given permission by the North Atlantic Council to increase the bombing intensity, agreed to shift resources toward attacking targets in Serbia proper.
| “This strategic bombing campaign was expected to succeed in a few days by coercing Belgrade’s compliance with alliance objectives. While the bombing campaign was a tactical success as the various sorties hit fixed and mobile targets, NATO did not have a secondary initiative to deal with Serbian defiance.” |
The alliance flew planes from Italy and Adriatic-based ships, with the intent of “surgically” attacking infrastructure sites in Serbia and Kosovo that would be followed by “tactical strikes” against the Yugoslav Army.[16] The Serbian attempt to counter NATO sorties with Yugoslav air assets proved ineffective. While NATO ultimately bombed Serbia into submission, the alliance encountered operational challenges including utilizing suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), marginalizing Serb camouflage and efforts to use civilians as shields, and avoidance of collateral damage.[17] The alliance triumphed by increasing the tempo of the sorties, bombing Belgrade directly, and threatening a ground invasion. Because NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was based on a humanitarian cause, the alliance carefully selected each of its targets in an effort to evade any flouting of international humanitarian law.[18] NATO’s bombing of Serbia also focused on fixed targets such as weapons, infrastructure, communication, and oil facilities. The NATO alliance remained intact, determined to defeat Milošević with 1000 planes and Clark’s threat of a ground invasion.[19] In addition, NATO’s decision to change the direction of the war by an intensification of bombing Serbia proper, specifically Belgrade, in reaction to the reality of the horrendous Serb-Albanian crisis, weakened Milošević’s support among the people. After it became apparent that NATO was determined to win, Milošević acquiesced to alliance demands and signed the Military Technical Agreement on June 9, which called for immediate cessation of hostilities, and provided eleven days for withdrawal of Yugoslav forces.[20]
The Agreement called for NATO ground forces to maintain a UN-endorsed occupation of Kosovo. Air operations were suspended and NATO forces prepared to enter Kosovo under Operation Joint Guardian. A day later, the Security Council passed resolution 1244, supporting an end to violence, a political solution to Kosovo, the withdrawal of Serbian military and police, and the deployment of international civil and security personnel.[21] With the official end of the war, displaced Albanians started the return to Kosovo while, at the same time, approximately half of Kosovar Serbs began to leave the region. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) took over the responsibility of civilian administration, and the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) accepted control of the military component.
Lessons Learned from Kosovo
There were several lessons to be learned from Kosovo. During Operation Allied Force, NATO encountered strategic and operational challenges. One problem was that the Operation started as an “unusual and disjointed campaign,” in which the alliance was not equipped with sufficient aircraft at the operational level, and was divided over strategic means, as members debated the best course of action.[22] With regard to the first challenge of this problem, NATO’s military strategy did not initially match available resources and overlooked the environmental factor of harsh weather conditions. The alliance, which had also underestimated Serbian resolve and brutality, started the mission with less than half its assigned aircraft. Naval air support did not arrive until two weeks into the campaign. The alliance could have achieved humanitarian and political objectives if it had deployed a massive number of sorties with over 1000 aircraft within the first twenty-four hours of bombing. NATO erred in not using overwhelming force to support its diplomatic efforts. This, coupled with the threat of increasing the number of warplanes and the tempo of the attacks, might have caused the Serbs to more readily reconsider negotiations. However, to its credit, NATO reacted in a month’s time by adjusting its strike effectiveness, increasing from 120 to 300 planes.[23] The lesson to be learned is the importance of developing a specific strategy, with all necessary resources in place, before launching a campaign.
Regarding the second challenge of this problem, General Clark, who represented NATO, continued to butt heads with other American commanders and politicians who spoke for American interests. Clark advocated for ground troops and the use of Apache helicopters that could maneuver nearer to the ground, pursue Serbian forces, and interfere with ethnic cleansing, but this approach was rejected by President Clinton who sought to preserve American lives.[24] Clark argued that NATO ground forces would surprise the Serbs and win the test of wills by demonstrating overwhelming strength and resolve. Relying solely on NATO bombing would not suffice to prevent the “door-to-door slaughter” of Kosovar Albanians.[25] Highlighting this second challenge of what could be considered NATO’s initially “disjointed campaign” was the acceleration of Serbian ethnic cleansing during the air war, an unanticipated consequence for the alliance that viewed the war in total industrial terms. Two wars were being fought at the same time: one a bloody insurgency in the streets of Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians that the KLA was losing, and, the other, a high tech campaign between NATO aircraft and Serbian air defenses. The former took place in the paradigm of war among the people while the NATO bombing was part of the industrial war paradigm. The KLA insurgency was occurring at no cost to the alliance in terms of manpower and the war from above did not jeopardize the lives of alliance personnel. It was difficult to attack Serb surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) as the Serbs turned off their radar in an attempt to force NATO planes to fly lower, but the alliance’s SEAD caused a devaluation of Serb SAMs.[26] Despite this, and an increase in aircraft, the military bombing strategy did not efficiently translate into the achievement of humanitarian and political objectives. The air strikes did not immediately halt the ethnic cleansing, and demonstrated a disconnect between objectives and military strategy. NATO should have deployed Special Forces to coordinate surgical ground attacks on the Yugoslav Army, and prevent or lessen ethnic cleansing. These forces could have also paved the way for humanitarian intervention, later referred to by former British Prime Minister Blair as an addendum to the military and political elements of war.[27] NATO also had the option of massing ground forces in Bosnia, where NATO forces were already present, in order to intimidate Milošević. In fact, it was Milošević’s belief that the alliance was considering deploying ground troops that was a major reason for his succumbing to NATO demands. The lesson to be learned is that air power has its limitations, and that planners should recognize the capacity of different assets at their disposal in order to accomplish the objective.
Another significant challenge was that NATO was fighting its previous air campaign in Bosnia, where bombings resulted in the acquiescence of Bosnian Serbs to alliance demands. However, Kosovo was not Bosnia. Kosovar Albanian politicians became emboldened by the threat of eventual NATO intervention.[28] Albanian politicians, who were supposed to be directing the KLA, could not impose order on their forces. Unlike Bosnia, Kosovo did not have peacekeepers within its borders, nor did indigenous forces that were supported by NATO begin to achieve victories. In Kosovo, due to political and personal divisions and struggles, the KLA did not function as a coherent force since its soldiers were largely divided between small autonomous elements, with no clear chain of command or strategy for maintenance of arms and supplies.[29] The KLA did, however, manage to provide NATO with limited credible intelligence. The industrial war fought by NATO occurred simultaneously with the KLA-led war among the people. However, this relationship between NATO and the KLA was a marriage of convenience and lacked the coordination of a homogeneous entity. The lesson to be learned is that no two conflicts are identical and conflict to preserve human security should fought after a correct assessment of all elements.
| “NATO erred in not using overwhelming force to support its diplomatic efforts. This, coupled with the threat of increasing the number of warplanes and the tempo of the attacks, might have caused the Serbs to more readily reconsider negotiations.” |
The last major challenge was the absence of specific long-range political goals regarding the occupation of Kosovo. UNMIK and KFOR were provided with difficult mandates, vague parameters, and the absence of a departure date. This would eventually lead the population to regard the international presence as another occupation threatening the independence of Kosovo. In part, the absence of such a political agenda to establish multi-ethnic respect and adherence to law resulted in UNMIK’s failure to sufficiently assert soft power and KFOR’s inadequate use of hard power.[30] During the initial deployment of KFOR, the weekly murder rate was around fifty.[31] This led to the transformation of the KLA from a coalition of ethnically uniform and politically diverse coalition of rebel fighters to a vigilante group intent on extracting revenge upon a new Serb minority population. On 21 June 1999, Hashim Thaçi signed the “Undertaking of demiliterization and transformation by the KLA” in which the KLA agreed to disarm and disband over a ninety day period.[32] Formally the KLA did just that but there were still weapons caches hidden throughout Kosovo. In September 1999, KFOR arrested eight men in an apartment that was acting as a weapons cache with a machine gun, cluster bombs, two anti-tank weapons, and landmines (“Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom?” 5).[33] The challenge was no longer securing Kosovo against a possible Serb return but how to transform this frustration by the ethnic Albanians into a constructive activity while also creating incentives for former KLA members to buy into the multi-ethnic mission of the UN administration and NATO forces. The lesson here is that a concrete strategy is essential for the formation of a multi-ethnic society where residents take ownership.
Conclusion
Kosovo was a confrontation that resulted in a negative peace, despite the war efforts of NATO and the high level of post-war international funding and commitment. The international community was able to provide security for one population but in turn encountered a new set of security dilemmas in the post conflict phase including protecting a minority that had been previously treated as the enemy. NATO’s had succeeded in the decisive air campaign and was able to achieve human security for Kosovar Albanians who were facing death and eviction by the Yugoslav army. However, the long-term, unanticipated consequences of an occupation and the lack of clarity regarding long-term objectives regarding an exit strategy prevented a “strategic solution” and created a status quo political environment.[34] Kosovo remains unsettled. While strategists cannot fight the last war, they can certainly learn valuable lessons from that last campaign. The lessons that Kosovo should have imparted are that when external international actors such as NATO seek to provide for the security of a select minority group in a region divided by tribal, ethnic or religious lines, the external actors should be prepared to keep the peace and order among all minority groups. In the end the chief political and strategic objectives should amount not just for winning the war but winning the peace. In that case there is human security for all.
Matthew Koppe is a May 2010 degree candidate for a Masters in the Science of Global Affairs, with a concentration in Transnational Security. Matthew graduated in 2008 from Pace University, Suma Cum Laude with a BA in History. He is currently focusing on a thesis project that examines the various problems and issues of post-conflict vigilantism. The two cases that Matthew is currently analyzing are those of vigilantism in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In addition to his studies, Matthew volunteers for the International Rescue Committee, and works as a Student Aide at NYU for Professor Mark Galeotti.
[1]Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security, (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 72.
[2]Iain King and Whit Mason, Peace at Any Price, How the World Failed Kosovo, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), 25.
[3]Julie Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) 18.
[4]Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, Leashing The Dogs Of War, Conflict Management In A Divided World,(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 138.
[5]“Flashback to Kosovo’s war” BBC NEWS, (Jul 10, 2006), 2.
[6]King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, How the World Failed Kosovo, 2.
[7]“NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo,” NATO’s role in Kosovo, (Jul 15, 1999), 2.
[8]“NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo,” NATO’s role in Kosovo, 2.
[9]“S/RES/1199,” United Nations Security Council, (Sept 23, 1998) 2.
[10]Mertus, Kosovo, How Myths and Truths Started a War, 309.
[11]Barry R. Posen, “The War for Kosovo: Serbia’s Political-Military Strategy,” International Security,
24:4, (Spring 2000) 44.
[12]Posen, “The War for Kosovo: Serbia’s Political-Military Strategy,” 39.
[13]Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World, (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 272.
[14]Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, California: RAND Publishing, 2001) xviii.
[15]Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 25, 26.
[16]Kennedy Hickman, “Kosovo War: NATO Aircraft Begin Operation Allied Force,” Military History, 1.
[17]Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, A Strategic and Operational Assessment, xvi.
[18]Power, “A Problem From Hell,” America and the Age of Genocide, (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 457.
[19]Power, “A Problem From Hell,” America and the Age of Genocide, 456.
[20]Bruce R. Nardulli et al., Disjointed War, Military Operation in Kosovo, 1999, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Publishing, 2002), 44.
[21]“S/RES/1244,” United Nations Security Council, (Jun 19, 1999) 2.
[22]Alastair Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 1991-1999, (Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2004) 87.
[23]Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 1991-1999, 87.
[24]Power, “A Problem From Hell,” America and the Age of Genocide, 454, 455.
[25]Mertus, Kosovo, How Myths and Truths Started a War, xii.
[26]Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, A Strategic and Operational Assessment, xvi.
[27]Dan Bortolotti, Hope In Hell, Inside The World Of Doctors Without Borders, (Buffalo, New York: Firefly Books, 2006), 221.
[28]Mertus, Kosovo, How Myths and Truths Started a War, 6.
[29]“The Kosovo Liberation Army,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 5:4 (May 1999) 2.
[30]King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, How the World Failed Kosovo, 22.
[31]King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, How the World Failed Kosovo, 53.
[32]“What Happened to the KLA?” International Crisis Group Balkans Report N°88, (Mar 3,2000), 1.
[33]“Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom?” International Crisis Group Balkans Report N°78, (Nov 2, 1999), 5.
[34]Smith, The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World, 293.